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This study examined the impact that privatization of the public water system in 
Atlanta had on the black middle class employees in the department. 
The case study approach was used to explore the cause and effect of the resolution 
that allowed the mayor of Atlanta to privatize the water system. The independent 
variable was the privatization system. There were many dependent variables being 
measured. 
In this project the researcher used primary and secondary information. The 
researcher utilized the Internet, personal interviews, and content analysis in order to reach 
a conclusion. There were also court cases studies done to try and predict the impact that 
privatization would have on the City of Atlanta. 
The conclusion drawn reflects the findings that the system of privatization has an 
ominous relationship with blacks. This system has the potential to further disenfranchise 
blacks in the Metro-Atlanta area. The city workers do not have the pension money they 
worked hard for. This system is in its early stages, but the research leads us to believe 
that this system is not beneficial to middle class blacks working in the water department. 
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The Atlanta City Council passed the following resolution in 1998, which 
empowered Mayor Bill Campbell to enter into an agreement with United Water Services 
to improve the management and operations of the public water supply system. Council 
member Michael Bond introduced resolution 98-1710 authorizing the mayor of Atlanta 
to: 
Enter into an appropriate contractual agreement for a 20-year term with 
United Water Services unlimited Atlanta LLC (FC-6946-98) for long-term 
operation and maintenance of the city of Atlanta’s water supply system in an 
amount not to exceed twenty one million four hundred thousand dollars 
($21,400,000.00) per year, a savings of over $400,000,000.00 for the 20year 
term, on behalf of the department of water. All contracted work shall be 
charged to and paid from the appropriate fund, account, and center number 
identified by the acting chief financial officer.1 
The above statement indicates how the managers of the public drinking water 
supply system worked closely with members from United Water Services to 
modernize the operation, service, delivery, and the management infrastructure of 
the Water Department in Atlanta. 




Resolution 98-0182 was adopted to carry out this modernization process 
by calling public and private attention to the combined sewer overflow problem, 
phosphorus, agricultural chemicals, and other forms of industrial solvents found in 
Atlanta’s public water. Men, women, and children that live in the black 
community of Atlanta and the metropolitan area are exposed to these pollutants 
that are in the public water system. 
This resolution also authorized the mayor and city council to begin the task 
of soliciting bids for proposals from the general public and the private sector to aid 
in the modernization process. The mayor and city council hoped that the 
advertisement would produce some sound and quality proposal bids from a variety 
of water companies. After the first bidding process was complete, the five best 
proposals were singled out for review. From the list of the top five companies, the 
city decided that United Water Service Unlimited (UWSU) had the best 
qualifications, experience, and expertise to ensure the formulation of an effective 
modernization plan. Lyonnaise American Holding established UWSU, which is a 
fully owned subsidiary of Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux (SLE) based in Paris. It is the 
world’s largest private manager of water supply and wastewater management. It 
is also the world’s largest private business that specializes in full service 
management of water and wastewater systems operated in the United States and 
the global community. 
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To operationalize the privatization plan, the City of Atlanta established a 
planning board whose responsibilities included devising a study to determine if the 
plan was workable and the most inexpensive approach to implementing the 
system. The board that was charged with this responsibility consisted of the 
private sector, the mayor’s chief executive staff and union heads. In the 
beginning, the board was asked to examine the sewer problem. In the end, the city 
decided that the only department that could be privatized was water maintenance. 
The board decided that they would cut costs by eliminating or relocating some 
personnel to minimize the annual impact of the water systems contract on the 
general fund. In the general contract, the city proposed to cut at least three 
positions from the budget. The positions were administrative assistant senior, data 
clerk senior, and cash collection technician. Union officials questioned this 
decision to privatize because it was made solely by the administration without 
seeking input from the board or the water customers.2 
2 Lew Peeples, Regional Director of AFSCME, interview by author, 2 February 1999. 
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The purpose of this study is to examine the potential impact that 
privatization of the public water system will have on the black middle-class 
municipal employees in Atlanta, Georgia. 
Statement of the Problem 
Some have praised this system as the remedy for every budget problem a 
city could encounter. Even some cities that are considered to have high efficiency 
ratings have looked to privatization for improvement. In the area of public 
education, vouchers symbolize one form of privatization that has many 
adversaries. What we have to understand is that this system is interpreted from 
many different perspectives. Cities such as Chicago and Indianapolis have 
accredited privatization for their cities’ increased efficiency rating. When trying 
to predict the potential effect that privatization can have on a single city, we are 
forced to ask some questions. One question is would it be impossible for one to 
examine a system such as privatization on a national scale? The dynamics of each 
city are so unique that it would be fallacious to imply that all city programs should 
be unilateral. This paper will explore the motivation behind Atlanta privatizing 
the water system. There is also exploration of the question of whether or not 
privatization would be beneficial to blacks working and living within the city. 
On January 1, 1999 United Water began a 20-year agreement with the 
City of Atlanta. This is the nation’s largest public-private partnership for water 
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operations ever established. United Water operates and maintains two of the three 
water treatment plants in the city. In addition to the Hemphill and Chattahoochee 
plants, they will also operate 12 water storage tanks, 7 zone-transfer pumping 
stations, 25,000 fire hydrants and a 2,400-mile network of water distribution 
mains. The company also manages billing, collections, and customer service 
functions.4 
Deteriorating infrastructure is without a doubt one of the biggest concerns 
for municipal wastewater systems. According to the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) 1992 Needs Survey Report to Congress, $46.8 billion is needed 
over the next two decades to rehabilitate and upgrade aging equipment at 
treatment plants, many of which were built or expanded in the late 1970s and early 
1980s with the aid of federal grants. Particularly hard hit was smaller wastewater 
authorities. 
Of the nation’s 28,582 treatment facilities, 19,150 serve fewer than 10,000 
residents and often have limited resource to make large capital investments or 
repairs. Traditional funding sources under the 1972 Federal Clean Water Act have 
long since dried up, and new ones are not expected from Washington lawmakers 
any time soon. Advocates of this arrangement envision significant operational 
savings. 
3 Morgan Stephen P.D.P.A , “Issues surrounding the privatization of public water services” 
(report under contract with the University of California), 17 September 1996, 1. 
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Critics believe such deals are risky, and worry that privatizers will drain all the 
profits out of a facility and leave the facility empty. While outsourcing grows in 
popularity, it only represented 10 percent of the wastewater market in 1998.4 5 
The concerns of this paper are the displaced workers and the future of the 
people who would normally rely on municipal employment. There is a need to 
explore the relationship between privatization and employment. The City of 
Atlanta currently employs 29,519 people.6 If the trend towards privatization 
continues to other municipal departments, the black employees working for the 
City of Atlanta will face detrimental circumstances. 
In this paper, black middle-class is defined by income. In the City of 
Atlanta, a majority of the black population makes less than $24,000 a 
year. The median income in this area is $22,275 with a per capita income of 
$15,279.7 The average water worker makes around $22,000. By those standards, 
a majority of the black water employees in the city of Atlanta are considered 
middle class. This topic is very important because of the many perplexing issues 
involving the role of the city in using private resources to repair dilapidated sewer 
systems. There is also a concern about implementing a system that is too ominous 
to the city’s employees. 
4 United Water, Municipal Information Atlanta, G A, (5 March 2000); available from 
http://www.unitedwater.com/atlanta.htm ; Internet. 
5 “Plant corrosion; wastewater treatment equipment” Public Works 7 July 1998, 129. 
6 Atlanta Regional Commission “Statistics of Employment in Georgia” (report prepared by the 
board commission 1998) 2-8. 
7 US Department of Commerce, “County City Data Book” (Bureau of the Census, 1994) 714. 
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Hypotheses 
The hypotheses of this paper involves the idea that privatization begets an 
ominous relationship between water workers and the City of Atlanta. After 
careful review of the literature, the following hypotheses will be tested: 
1. Privatization will contribute to the improvement of the management 
and operations the City of Atlanta Water plants and services. If the 
system is implemented, many city workers will be displaced of 
without any support from the City of Atlanta, or the Union. 
2 The process of implementing the privatization system will become 
saturated with political strife. The older and more experienced 
workers will be displaced or removed off of the payroll without 
proper thought and procedure. 
3. Privatization will have a detrimental impact on the future of blacks 
employed in the government water department if they have to be 
employed by private companies that have a history of discriminating 
against them. 
Methodology 
This paper is a case study of how the City of Atlanta Mayor’s Office and 
some members of Atlanta City Council devised a plan to improve the management 
and operation of the city’s water plants. 
Data collected for the study came from interviewing current members of the 
City of Atlanta Water Department, which includes Tony Kivem. The study also 
sought to interview at least 50 city workers that were displaced due to 
privatization. The researcher used a variety of journals, books, and newspaper 
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articles discussing how the privatization plan would impact municipal black 
middle class employees and the general public. There were interviews with union 
representatives Harlan Joy and Lew Peeples to gain an understanding of the 
union’s involvement during the negotiation and implementation of the 
privatization system. Other interviews included Barry Bozeman, a professor of 
Public Administration at Georgia Institute of Technology, and George Heery, 
President of the Atlanta Metro-Group. 
A statistical analysis was conducted to predict the effects of privatization 
on the municipal black middle class employees. There was an examination of the 
amount of jobs that were cut in the City of Atlanta Water Department because of 
the new system of privatization. There was a concern about the amount of city 
workers that were released due to privatization. There was a need to determine the 
empirical validity of the claim that privatization is the best system for everyone 
living in the City of Atlanta including the water workers. For reasons of 
simplicity the statistical model will be bi-variate. If no linear relation exists, a 
multivariate model must be constructed to determine any spurious relations. 
Content analysis was used to determine whether the proponents and 
opponents of privatization have an accurate argument. Both arguments will be 
presented, and then there will be an attempt to validate the arguments with 
empirical information. An inquiry of the case studies complied by the American 
Metropolitan Water Association will be done. The current compensation packages 
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offered by United Water Company will have to be compared to the compensation 
package that was offered by the city. An examination of the origin of privatization 
and the movement toward this system is necessary in order to offer a 
comprehensive analysis of this system. 
A thorough examination of the class action lawsuit brought by the City 
water workers (Civil Action 1998 CV.00374) will be conducted in order to 
support or reject some of the written information obtained throughout the research 
process. There will be interviews from individuals that participated in the 
privatization process in Atlanta. There will also be a use of the Internet to find 
information about different court cases and other material pertaining to 
privatization and Atlanta. 
Dependent and Independent Variables 
The dependent variable in this project is the impact privatization has on the 
black middle class municipal employees. This is measured by the number of city 
workers released or forced to retire because of the privatization of the water 
system. The factors that make up the dependent variables are the work stability of 
the current water workers along with the prospect of future blacks receiving 
gainful employment with the city. 
The independent variable is the system of privatization being implemented 
by the City of Atlanta. Privatization has been used to describe a wide assortment 
of public-private relationships including contracting, franchising, voucher systems, 
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and the complete abandonment of a public service to the private sector. 
Privatization claims must always be evaluated in the context of the definition used, 
since the type of privatization proposed may greatly influence its chances for 
success. 
There is often an underlying assumption that private sector organizations 
are naturally superior to public sector bureaucracies. The argument for greater 
efficiency of the market compared to traditional bureaucracy is often simply 
asserted with little attempt at justification. The evidence of effectiveness and the 
quality of service are debatable. The lack of clear evidence makes the introduction 
of the market into the public sector a matter of faith as much as technique.8 
Definition of Concepts 
George Wilson, professor at Indiana University, defines privatization as 
“the act of having greater reliance upon market forces to generate production of 
particular goods and services.” 
Another definition of privatization is a process by which government 
engages the private sector to provide capital or otherwise finance government 
programs, purchase government assets, and/or operate government programs 
through various types of contractual agreements. Most systems of privatization 
Morgan 1996, 9 
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occur in combination with other downsizing initiatives so privatization involves 
a combination of all of these definitions.9 
In a perfect competition there is an absence of externalities, especially 
negative externalities. An externality occurs whenever the activity of one entity 
affects the welfare of another entity in a way that is outside of a market 
transaction. The existence of a well-maintained water system in a community 
creates a positive externality by adding value to the property of the customer. One 
is much more likely to save money and receive quality service if there is 
competition in contracting and efficiency incentives are built into the contract.10 
Competition is not as easy to encourage, as it might seem. Often there are 
hidden monopolies of labor or available vendors that cause trouble for private 
operation and reduce efficiency and capability for contract management. The 
competitive market environment imposes a discipline that controls prices while 
encouraging efficiency and quality. To succeed in the marketplace, a seller must 
offer a product at a price and quality that is comparable to that of his or her 
competition. Without competition, a monopoly exists and the incentives for the 
producer are reversed. Water supply is considered to be a natural monopoly. 
9 John Miller and Christopher Tufts “Privatization is a mean to More with less” National Civic 
Review, March/April 1998,1-6. 
10 wiff Peterson “EPD, Fines, and Privatization” (report from the Atlanta Water Department 
1996), 1. 
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Average costs continue to decrease as the size of the producer grows to the 
point that a single company meets the entire demand. In lay terms, given the 
present technology, it probably does not make sense for multiple companies to run 
parallel pipelines into the same neighborhoods and let citizens hook up to 
whatever company they choose. Service quality is not diminished.11 
A monopolistic environment highlights both the limitations of the private 
sector and the strengths of government. A single-purpose enterprise agency, such 
as a water district, provides the customer with a unit of output for a specified 
price. 
Although the lack of competition in water service affords the collective 
customer group substantial influence over pricing via the ballot box, the manner in 
which privatization is implemented is the main concern. The options are full 
privatization, re-engineering, contracting operations, and assets sales. 
Full privatization means that a function once performed by the government 
would be completely performed by the private sector with no more regulations 
imposed upon the firm than would be accepted for any other business. This 
transformation is relatively rare in the United States. Private contracts, vouchers, 
and franchises all offer opportunities for public-private partnerships and all have 
been referred to as privatization. It is clear that the term has different meanings 
11 Morgan 1996, 14. 
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and that each establishes a different role for public sector provision and private 
sector production.12 
Like many developing industries and public organizations, government 
agencies over the past ten years have taken steps to improve their labor and water 
performance by reducing costs. Systematic evaluations of governmental 
operations with these goals in mind are often referred to as re-engineering. 
Agencies that routinely build self-evaluation and reengineering processes into 
their yearly operating management plans became the most consistently efficient 
i "j 
and successful operators in their line of business. 
Regardless of the incentives, the process of reengineering often results in 
higher quality services and reduction of costs. As costs are reduced, many public 
agencies find that they can out bid even the most efficient private provider since 
public water agencies do not make a profit, and they do not have to pay taxes on 
their earnings. Government agencies have access to tax-exempt financing through 
soft loans under state revolving fund programs. Ultimately, these total savings 
will depend on the efficiency of existing operations. It is not unusual to generate 
twenty-percent net savings using the reengineering process. 
This system conducts an in-depth analysis of the performance of its own 
operations, relative to well-articulated set of objectives. 
12 American Metropolitan Sewer Association 
AMSA conference 1997), 6. 
13 AMSA, “Managed Competition,” 7. 
Managed Competition,” ( paper presented at the 
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This is where a utility compares its performance indicators to those of the 
best in class utilities. Results often provide targets for improvement, expressed in 
terms of percent savings that should be attainable through process automation or 
cross training of a reduced labor force. Not all-reengineering techniques will suit 
every local situation. This list is not meant to be exhaustive.14 
Many municipalities are growing increasingly interested in the potential to 
improve efficiencies and reduce costs of operating public water services through 
contracts with the private sector. These contracts can vary widely and range from 
long-term commitments to finance, build, and operate publicly-owned facilities 
through concession agreements lasting 20 years or more. The length of the 
contracts and the ways in which risks are shared between public and private 
partners can vary widely. Arrangements and contractual factors will have 
significant bearings on the potential savings, level of control, and potential 
impacts on citizens and the environment. 
Indianapolis, being the most recent case of successful privatization, has 
given other municipalities an unrealistic expectation regarding private sector 
abilities.15 These operations provide for a five-year $72 million contract for 
wastewater and sewage treatment. Incomplete analysis of the direct costs of 
14 American Metropolitan Sewer Association, “Evaluating Privatization,” Article issued at the 
AMSA conference (1997) 20-25. 
15 American Metropolitan Sewer Association, “Evaluating Privatization,” 18. 
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privatization, and poorly negotiated contracts has sometimes contributed to the 
government and the taxpayers bearing the costly risks in the future. Within this 
form of privatization, there are some issues that involve public safety and 
employment. While there are many ways of dealing with employee issues so as to 
minimize or cushion the effects of job loss, the remedies can be costly and their 
impact must be fully considered when comparing the costs of public and private 
alternatives. Private operators achieve cost savings in part by reducing personnel 
or employee compensation. Often, local governments attempt to mitigate the 
impacts on existing employees be requiring that privatizers offer existing 
employees jobs. They offer placement programs, out-placement services, and 
early retirement packages. They also require privatizers to adhere to existing 
wage and health packages.16 The aspects that are being left out are future 
employment, union membership, and training for other employment in case the 
employee does not want to work for the privatizer. While the methods mentioned 
earlier can be effective in minimizing the impacts of the privatization 
process on employees, many of these programs require planning and resources to 
implement. When evaluating public-private operating options, local governments 
must be fully aware of the impacts of privatization on existing employees and of 
the costs of managing these employment issues. 
16 American Metropolitan Sewer Association, “Evaluating Privatization,” 18-25. 
Asset sales involve the private purchase of a public facility, thereby 
transferring ownership and operating responsibility to a private entity. The 
private entity assumes the city’s franchise and operating certificates, therefore 
taking control over future planning, construction, and operational functions. 
This is relatively new way of operate to wastewater system. Other asset sales have 
been considered, but political, legal, and regulatory concerns have led 
communities to explore alternatives. Nonetheless, some cities facing significant 
budget pressures may view the sale of their wastewater treatment plant as a way to 
quickly raise cash. Loss of control over environmental protection and the loss of 
connectivity with related governmental services are the most frequently cited 
reasons to reject asset sales. Franchise bidding is a form of asset sales that occurs 
when a private company is granted exclusive distribution rights in a given area 
that may or may not own the physical distribution system, and is regulated by 
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some form of public oversight body. 
Since the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which eliminated several 
incentives for private ownership of treatment facilities, there have been few asset 
sales of wastewater treatment facilities. 
Although other asset sales have been considered, political, legal, and regulatory 
concerns have led communities to explore other options for public-private 
ownership. 
17 American Metropolitan Sewer Association, “Evaluating Privatization,” 32. 
17 
There are some employment issues relevant to asset sales, but most 
important is the potential strike risk. If employees gain the right to strike under 
the new ownership structure, the occurrence of a strike may cause a service 
interruption that would present an unacceptable risk to environmental and public 
health. Local governments need to consider whether or not it is possible to control 
this risk. This assessment will vary from state to state, or whether measures can 
be taken to reduce either the risk of the potential consequences of service 
interruption caused by a strike under certain circumstances. To guard against the 
possibility of a strike, local governments may need to have an entity take over 
some or all of the functions of the privatized facility. The private corporation 
might bargain for a no-strike clause in a union labor agreement in exchange for 
additional salary. The public health and environmental implications of a strike 
1 o 
must be explored during evaluation of asset sale options. 
Managed-competition is a process where both public and private entities bid for 
the right to deliver a well-defined package of services over a specified time. The public 
sector is invited along with the private vendors to bid on contracts to supply wastewater 
treatment services. 
These services can become relatively complicated for the existing public 
department because it requires experts in procurement, cost, accounting, and contract 
law. 
18 American Metropolitan Sewer Association, “Evaluating Privatization,” 32. 
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Some recent contracts, won by both public and private providers, have yielded 
significant savings. In many ways, public providers have distinct advantages in these 
competitions since they are already familiar with the facility. They do not have to make a 
profit or pay taxes on the profit and may enjoy other financial advantages such as 
municipal insurance. 
Pre-competition activities include organizing a bidding and a process 
management team. The activities also include communicating with employees, 
elected officials, labor unions, general public, and other interested constituencies. 
Preparation of competition documents, which typically include both a Request for 
Qualifications and a Request for Proposals, include pre-proposal activities, such as 
document review, physical inspections and facilities visits, and formal question 
and answer opportunities. A proposed evaluation process leads to selections. No 
two managed competitions are alike. A comprehensive managed-competition 
process can take about a year to complete. During that period, the cost of 
specialized consultants, such as attorneys with expertise in contract law, engineers, 
and financial advisors, can range from $300,000 and $500,000. Costs can escalate 
and time periods can lengthen if most of the information needed to support 
competition is not readily available. If the managed competition process is 
successful and if it yields savings relative to current budgets, payback periods for 
such an investment can be as short as six months.19 
19
 American Metropolitan Sewer Association, “Evaluating Privatization,” 1997, 33. 
Relevance of the Topic 
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Privatization of the municipal wastewater service is a very important issue. 
Wastewater utilities provide many other services including: 
A. protection against sewer backups, fires, and explosion under the 
national industrial wastewater pretreatment program; 
B. technical assistance on wastewater treatment and waste 
minimization to industrial customers; 
C. ambient water quality, ground water, and sediment monitoring; 
D. provision of reclaimed water supplies; 
E. septic tank retrofitting and septage pumping; 
F. disaster planning and emergency preparedness and response; 
G. cooperation with neighboring level governments or large 
institutional user such as universities, military installations, or 
government complexes; 
H. public education and outreach programs; and 
I. participation with state and federal regulatory agencies on issues of 
policy and rule making.21 
This topic is of major importance to the blacks living in urban areas. A 
privatization decision made without proper consideration has the potential of 
destroying a city’s infrastructure. The mass laying-offs that are associated with 
privatization may cause major problems for other public departments of the city.22 
20
 American Metropolitan Sewer Association, “Evaluating Privatization,” 1997, 1-6. 
21 American Metropolitan Sewer Association “Evaluating Privatization” 1997, 8. 
22 Y. Kodrycki, “Privatization of Local Public Service “ New England Economic Review. 
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, May 1994. 
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The amount of homelessness and the amount of crime that is caused by an influx 
in unemployment increased the demand for police force. This placed a heavier tax 
burden on the citizens in the area. 
Another concern is the amount of black youth that would no longer rely on 
employment from the public sector. This is of special concern because the 
government is the only sector that is obligated by law to hire a portion of 
minorities. As it stands, the city will ensure the job security of the current 
employees of the water for 3-5 years. 
Privatization of the water system could lead public officials to contract out 
other services including road maintenance, vehicle registration, food service, 
school bus operations, and solid waste disposal.24 
Many municipalities have had to re-establish operating control of their 
services where private companies have not met all expectations that privatization 
promised. The regaining governmental control was the result of unrealistic 
expectations regarding private sector abilities and incomplete analysis of the direct 
and indirect costs of privatization. This was also the product of poorly negotiated 
contracts that leave the governments bearing the future costly risks. In some cases 
governments have found that costs were not saved, but merely shifted from one 
municipal account to another. 
23 Lew Peeples, Local Director AFCSME (AFL-CIO) interviewed by the author 2 February 1999. 
24 Robert A. Albert III, “Privatization Research Project” (Ph.D diss., University of Alabama, 
Fall 1996),1-25. 
25 American Metropolitan Sewer Association “Evaluating Privatization” 1997, 18. 
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It is understood that most systems of privatization, the cost-effective 
measure embodies the reduction of labor force. It has also been stated that job 
cuts usually adversely affect lower labors and middle management. The problem 
is large portions of black men working for the City of Atlanta are employed as 
operators, fabricators, and laborers. A layoff at this level will have a detrimental 
impact on black males. In 1993, the municipal sector employed more blacks than 
any other level of government this remains constant today. 
Public agencies that turn over operations to private concerns may incur 
responsibility for the placement of downsized employees. The people running the 
plants and responding to repair needs may no longer be residents of the 
community. Public employees, on the other hand, may have access to a wider 
range of employment opportunities and training tinder private management.27 
Procedure of Inquiry 
The research study is organized into six chapters. Chapter I is an 
introduction that presents the legislation that allowed the mayor of Atlanta to 
privatize the water system. The reader is also introduced to the privatization 
concepts. Chapter II reveals the relevant literature on the topic. Chapter III 
explores the movement toward privatization by the city of Atlanta. 
1990. 
26 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census the office of statistics, Census CD-ROM 
27 Public Works Journal Corporation, “Private/Public partnerships: a balancing act.” 15 April 
1998, 14. 
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It also provides background and demographic information about Atlanta. 
Chapter IV compares the court cases that resulted from privatization in Atlanta 
and Denver. Chapter V discusses the perspectives of the advocates and opponents 
of privatization and the short-term impact that this system had on the city workers 
of Atlanta. Chapter VI is a summary and conclusion of all the information 
obtained during the research process. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Atlanta privatized its water department in an effort to save the city money, and 
allow the agency to operate more efficiently. The question that must be raised is at what 
expense? In many instances, the savings that are accumulated from privatization comes 
from job cuts. 
David R. Hunter, worldwide managing partner of Anderson Consulting’s 
Government Practice, wrote an article entitled, “Strategic Advances, Creating the New 
Public Enterprise,” were he discusses various privatization relationships. The following 
section examines three privatization concepts that were discussed in the article. 
The first relationship to be addressed is the Strategic Source Relationship. This 
occurs when governments consider using internal business systems, technology 
applications, or processes to gain a strategic advantage. This method benefits 
governments by reducing costs and improving efficiencies. The quality of the services is 
managed through service level agreements between the government and the private entity 
that often include specific performance targets. 
The second relationship mentioned in the article is Value-Based Arrangements. 
Value-Based Arrangements occur when other governments recognize the need for 
revolutionary change, but find that budgetary constraints prohibit the change from 
occurring. To meet their needs, they forge relationships with consulting organizations 
23 
24 
occurring. To meet their needs, they forge relationships with consulting organizations 
and develop innovative financial arrangements. These arrangements are based on the 
delivery of a key outcome or identifiable value. This helps governments achieve 
objectives without conventional budget demands. These value-based arrangements let 
the government and consultant share, to varying degrees, the project risks and rewards. 
Two key principles help determine an appropriate value-based financial arrangement. 
First, both parties must identify a suitable revenue stream that will increase, or a cost base 
that will decrease as a result of the project. The amount of increased revenue or 
decreased cost ultimately will pay for the project. Second, the two parties must set an 
acceptable time frame for achieving these results. This process establishes when each 
party can anticipate realizing benefits, and when the payments from these benefits will be 
derived. 
The third relationship to privatization is the Build, Own, Operate system. This is 
the transformational process that may require a substantial capital investment. For some 
governments, Build, Own, Operate arrangements are needed. With these arrangements, a 
private contractor incurs the costs of building or developing an asset, owns the asset, and 
receives a service fee for asset operation. An alternative option in these arrangements is 
to transfer the assets to the government at a future date.1 Governments may gain from 
these arrangements. They no longer need to incur large debts, obtain required technical 
expertise, or carry the project risk. In addition to the ongoing benefits of reducing service 
Public Works 1998, 2. 1 
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costs, governments benefit from the leading edge solutions often developed in a 
specialized organization.2 
Myths about Privatization 
There are many myths that exaggerate the promises of privatization, such as the 
system being a panacea of the water industry. Some of the myths also carry a negative 
connotation, such as the system being antigovemment. Some of the myths are based on 
truth, while others are frankly false. 
One myth states that every form of privatization involves an absolute change in 
ownership. Transferring ownership and operations from the public to the private sector is 
the only absolute form of privatization. This form of privatization is referred to as Full- 
Privatization. Full-Privatization offers certain advantages, especially in terms of access 
to private capital and long-term infrastructure planning. A broader definition of 
privatization recognizes a full range of options that involve the public and private sectors 
as partners in assuring the provision of services. Privatization does not have to be an all- 
or-nothing proposition. Marketization and competitivization are terms that are used in 
the privatization movement to shift the focus of ownership to the more salient issue of 
operational efficiency. When functioning properly, privatization can help fulfill 
governmental mandates more effectively and efficiently. The federal mandates 
pertaining to water include Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) and Clean Water Act 
(CWA), as well as a host of state and local government mandates, regulations, and 
standards that apply to all public and private service providers. With the use of 
privatization, governments can implement policies and regulations to foster market 
2 Public Works 1998, 3. 
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growth, while ensuring accountability. Privatization will also allow governments to 
provide a social safety net to mitigate undesirable market outcomes. 
Another myth surrounding privatization states that the system is anti-labor. 
Privatization arrangements have been justified on the grounds that they will help resolve 
labor disputes and lower the costs of operations. Increasing worker productivity is a 
central goal of privatization, but labor interests fear the outright loss of jobs. 
Privatization may be arranged to address the interests of the existing labor force. In many 
cases, work wages, benefits, training, and advancement opportunities can be improved 
with privatization. When privatization involves growth and/or diversification, job 
opportunities may expand. Some labor organizations have redefined their roles to 
include helping government workers prepare competitive bids for a contract. Placing 
water resources in the hands of the private sector seems contrary to the idea of protecting 
public interest. All public water providers must be good environmental stewards in order 
to preserve the quality of the product they deliver. 
Another myth states that privatization requires little public involvement. In 
matters where public assets, funding, and trust are involved, the public will want and 
need to be informed about all options under consideration. Treating privatization as just 
another business deal undermines the public’s faith in community leaders. While 
opportunities for public involvement in some aspects of privatization may be limited, 
public understanding and support for the idea of privatization seems to be essential for 
success. Regardless of market forces and privatization, the water industry will always be 
affected by the public interest. 
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Many believe that in order for a private entity to be successful, it must pay a 
lower capital investment, and decreased taxes. Ideally, productivity and efficiency gains 
will offset the costs associated with privatization. One of the chief attractions of 
privatization may be the ability to shift costs, often rising costs, from the public to the 
private sector. When realized, the savings from privatization often are needed to pay for 
improvements or expansion, so that rate increases are not implemented. When 
privatization involves a move toward full-cost pricing, economic efficiency will be 
improved, but utility prices actually might increase. 
The last myth states that privatization is a possibility for every water system as 
long as there are willing buyers and sellers. Some facilities may be off limits for political 
or institutional reasons. For buyers, some facilities may be unattractive for privatization 
in terms of location and financial considerations. When the marketplace does not provide 
opportunities for privatization, other means of efficiency improvement can and should be 
explored. The water industry faces significant challenges in terms of rising costs, 
evolving structure, and a public demand. Investing in the utility infrastructure, finding 
cost-effective ways to meet future demands, and protecting water resources require a 
long-term view extending well beyond the time frame of the typical contract for 
operations. Privatization can play a significant roll in the future of the water industry, but 
it cannot provide an answer to all of the industry’s planning and policy needs.3 




The most widely publicized example of privatization occurred in Indianapolis 
Indiana, where the work force fell from 328 to 205 shortly after privatization was 
implemented. In Indianapolis’s old system of government, there was a large amount of 
featherbedding and waste. With this in mind, those job cuts were relevant. If there is a 
decrement in the amount and quality of services provided after privatization is 
operational, then the job cuts are germane. In Indianapolis, the new private water 
company only hired 196 of the 322 former government sewer workers. The remaining 
employees benefited from a company-funded job placement service. They were all 
eventually hired in comparable or better positions.4 The contractual savings of 
Indianapolis over the five years of the wastewater contract amounted to $65 million, or a 
phenomenal 44 percent. If the cost savings that was achieved during the first two years 
continued, that actual savings would have amounted to $69 million. The savings was 
used to repair the water storage facility and to upgrade equipment. After the treatment, 
the city’s water supply was cleaner than ever before. 
Though the volume of treated wastewater is higher than before, violations of 
water quality standards have decreased by 57 percent under private management. The 
number and duration of sewer overflows have also decreased.5 Indianapolis privatized 
the management of their wastewater treatment plant, and contracted for maintenance 
4 Janet Ward, “The Pros and Cons of long-term privatization” American City & County (May 
1998): 66. 
5 City of Indianapolis, Advanced Study of the Wastewater Treatment Initiative” (May 2000) 
available from www.indv.irov.org/inavor/comn/ptl/cases/02.html. Internet. 
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services on the city’s fleet of trucks and heavy equipment.6 Indianapolis is an 
acknowledged leader in the privatization movement. In 1991, the city moved forty public 
services into the private market. Barry Goldsmith, Indianapolis’s former mayor, believed 
that the competitive process of contract bidding was the key to the savings. He argued 
that a monopoly is a fundamental barrier to effective government. Government agencies 
have no competition, they have no incentive to provide decent services at reasonable cost. 
Mayor Goldsmith believed that public employees were often good people working in bad 
systems. In Indianapolis, some municipal departments had already won some 
competitive contracts. But in the process of winning the bids, they became more efficient 
and eliminated unnecessary jobs. In Indianapolis, Goldsmith split the city into 11 
districts, the Department of Public Works won a contract in four districts, while the other 
went to private companies. All the winners provided effective service or risked losing 
the contract when it comes up for renewal in three to five years. It was the viewpoint of 
Indianapolis, that it may be efficient to have the city provided water, but it does not need 
to increase the bill for water services. Many private firms provided the same services as 
the city agencies and could bid on contracts with the government just as they bid for 
contracts to handle accounts receivable.7 
The cost savings are clear, but the jury is still out regarding service effectiveness 
of the system. In recent years, only one city had completed a sale of wastewater utility 
assets to a private entity. 
6 John C. Weicher, “+Making cents better city services for less,” Transaction Publishers Society 
(15 May 1998):2. 
7 Weicher 1998, 2. 
30 
That option has become particularly appealing to elected officials since the signing of 
Executive Order E.0.12803 by President George H. Bush. This executive order gave 
preferred repayment of local investments with federal funds for the sale of federally 
grant-funded wastewater treatment facilities to a private concern. Many municipal 
organizations have taken steps to re-engineer their operations to match or better the 
efficiency of the private sector. More than 600 of the nation’s largest wastewater utilities 
have undertaken comprehensive efficiency audits of the operations.8 
Under this arrangement, private contract vendors compete for the right to provide 
wastewater management services under contract to a local government. The choice of 
both the competitive processes for selecting a private vendor and the terms of the 
resulting contract will depend on local procurement conventions, securities laws, 
complexity of the operation to be privatized, and other factors. 
Opposition to Indianapolis 
Indiana State Representative, Mae Dickson, said the Indianapolis’ privatized 
wastewater treatment system prompted her to start buying bottled water. She sponsored a 
bill in the Indiana State Legislature to force the government to prove that privatization 
equals cheaper rates. House Bill 1444, required governmental bodies that wanted to 
contract out a services to first verify that privatization would be cheaper than letting the 
work continue to be done by their employees. Dickerson stated that privatization was 
billed as a money-saver, but she has not seen any savings. David Larson, of the Indiana 
State Employees Association said the bill would require outside contractors to justify that 
8 Albert 1996,2. 
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they can do a better job than we could ourselves. He went on to state that this 
absolutely should have been done a long time ago.9 
This example shows that even in the City of Indianapolis, which is the paradigm 
for privatization, there are still some people that do not agree with the claims that 
privatization is the panacea of good government. 
Long-Term Contracts 
The sales of wastewater utility assets-divestiture became popular in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. This was attributed to the attractive tax treatment under the existing 
United States tax code. 
In essence, the Executive Order eliminated the requirement for federal 
investment to local water facilities by establishing legislation for the sales price be 
distributed in the following order: (1) repayment of the original cost (not depreciated) of 
all state and local government investment to date, (2) if proceeds remain, repayment of 
only the undepreciated (using 1RS accelerated depreciation schedules for the asset 
classes in questions) portion of the federal investment, and (3) the remaining proceeds to 
state and local governments.10 
Some wastewater systems find that contracting for private delivery of certain 
portions of their operations, while retaining control over the system as a whole makes 
financial sense. Typically, sufficient competition and multiple vendors exist to assure 
quality performance and low cost, wastewater utilities can provide commodity-like 
9 The Indianapolis Star, “Bill Changes Privatization,” City/State, 24 Yéb \999, C02. 
10 Melinda Langston, Chief Management Analyst, City of Atlanta, interview by the author, 3 
March 1997. 
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services on the market and reduce costs compared to performing the same functions in- 
house. 
Water utilities also choose to contract out certain functions for other reasons, 
which will vary from place to place. The Massachusetts Water Resource Authority 
(MWRA), for example, will need extra staff to focus on start-up of its new Nut Island 
facility. The authority chose to contract out operations of its facility for an 18-month 
period and transfer trained MWRA staff to Nut Island to meet these needs. The staff from 
Quincy returned to their original plant after an 18-month period. 
Due to the lack of state and federal monetary aid, cities are forced to negotiate 
with private entities over the maintenance of their wastewater facilities. In the late 
1980s, cities were in a situation where they could not engage in long-term contracts. The 
Executive Order 12803 opened the door to long-term privatization by setting out the 
conditions pertaining to grant repayments for ownership of facilities being transferred to 
private parties. In January 1997,1RS regulations changed to allow the safe harbor 
management contracts of up to 20 years, the prior limit was five years. Cities such as 
Cranton Rhode Island, benefited from a long-term agreement with Triton Ocean State, 
which is a wastewater treatment company. Trinton paid the city an up front payment of 
$48 million, and agreed to secure an additional $30 million in private financing to fund 
the system’s mandated capital improvements.11 Prior to the 1997,1RS regulations set a 
the basic rule was that if a public jurisdiction had tax-exempt debt outstanding, it could 
not enter into a service contractual arrangement with private parties for more than five 
years. Violating this rule would result in the entity losing it’s tax-exempt status. There 
11 Ward 1998, 56. 
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was concern that the private firms would use those agreements as a backdoor to receive 
public contracts. The recent rules were believed to create safe harbors that permit 
private operation or ownership of a facility while maintaining the tax-exempt status of the 
bonds used to finance that facility. Public utility property contracts may now extend 20 
years, or 80 percent of the useful life of the facility, as long as at least 80 percent of the 
1 9 
compensation under the contract consists of a periodic fixed fee. 
If a company is able to keep rates at the same level it can achieve significant 
savings. According to Roger Feldman, Chairman of the Project Finance and Privatization 
Group with the D.C. law firm Bingham Dana, stated that long-term contract by its very 
nature is cost effective. In the modem age, one can control costs if it is being done on a 
long-term basis. Cities are doing this because it allows them to involve private sector 
efficiency tools and techniques. North Brunswick attributes the savings of $46 million 
over 20 years to its operations and maintenance contract with a Chicago-based U.S. 
Water.13 According to John Joyner, an official at United Water, “Long-term contracts 
allow for a more reasonable approach to labor than do short-term deals, they allow for 
more attrition.” With a five-year deal, there’s much more pressure on the private 
company to reduce labor costs early.14 
Wastewater utilities have been contracting for private provision of non-core 
functions for decades and everyday the wastewater utility managers face uninformed 
decisions as part of their on-going responsibilities. The most commonly contracted 
services include building grounds maintenance, billing and collection of payments, and 
12 Ward 1998, 58-60. 
13 Ward 1998, 58-60. 
14 Ward 1998, 66. 
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biosolid management. Contracting for private delivery of wastewater management 
services in its entirety is not new, although less than one percent of all wastewater 
utilities are under contract. Interests in operating contracts are growing, and private firms 
are aggressively seeking new opportunities to provide expanded service to local 
governments. 
Some government wastewater utilities have taken the offensive by becoming 
more entrepreneurial. They are taking on contract operation assignments for neighboring 
jurisdictions as a business, or by selling services specifically to generate revenue. 
Colorado Springs is currently evaluating the economics of providing operations support 
to a neighboring wastewater utility serving the U.S. Air Force Academy. Orange County, 
California, recently created a General Services Division specifically to sell services to the 
local governments within the county. The Atlantic County Utilities Authority, located in 
New Jersey, sells services to the landfill for monitoring the county, neighboring cities, 
and local schools. The authority also sells excess vehicle maintenance capacity to 
surrounding local governments. Another example is Alameda County, California where 
the Union Sanitary District provides sewer-cleaning services to a neighboring city. 
The City of San Diego has reached an agreement with the International Boundary 
and Water Commission (IBWC), to provide ocean monitoring services for the IBWC’s 
new wastewater treatment plant located in San Diego, just north of the Mexican border. 
The Environmental Monitoring and Technical Services Division of the San Diego 
Metropolitan Wastewater Department was awarded a one-year $1.1 million contract to 
conduct these services. 
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The costs of private contract operations must include the proposed private cost, 
plus additional public costs resulting from contracting to private vendors. Appropriate 
public costs include the request for proposal preparation, proposal review, contract 
negotiation, contract administration, quality control, monitoring, one-time conversion 
costs, gain or loss on the sale or transfer of assets, and contingency costs. Additional 
direct income to the public entity and additional tax revenues from private operations 
should be subtracted from private costs. Request for Proposal includes the costs 
associated with conducting in-house consultant feasibility studies, preparing request for 
qualifications, reviewing proposals received, and negotiating a final contract with the 
winning bidder. These costs, which can be substantial for the more complex facilities, 
will reoccur every time the contract is redone. 
The longest water privatization contracts in the history of the United States are as 
follows: 
• Indianapolis - 10 years 
• Milwaukee-10 years 
• Gary- 10 years 
• Atlanta- 20 years15 
The City of Atlanta saved an additional $1.9 million a year by extending their 
contract from 10 to 20 years. With a 10-year contract, the city would only have saved 
$18.1 million a year and $181 million over the life of the contract. With a 20-year 
contract, they would save $20 million a year and $400 million over the life of the 
contract.16 
15
 Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux (September 1999) available from http//www.suez-lvonnaise- 
eaux.fr/english/metier/eau/intro.htnx Internet. 
16 Water Contract Management General Fund Impact final Plan, report presented to Atlanta City 
Council, 3 October 1998. 
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On January 5, 1998, United Water Services signed the one of the nation’s largest 
public-private partnership agreement for wastewater operations. United water signed a 
10-year agreement with the Milwaukee Metropolitan Sewage District. United Water now 
manages the district’s two largest wastewater treatment plants, the Milorganite biosolids 
fertilizer plant, the sewer interceptor system, and deep tunnel storage networks in 
addition to its 30-megawatt power plant. United Water operates and maintains Jones 
Island and South Shore, the city’s two wastewater treatment plants. The company also 
produces high quality, golf course-grade Miloganite fertilizer from the city’s sewer 
sludge. In addition, the company is installing a premier computerized system that will 
allow on-line access at all times. 
The Jones Island and South Shores facilities handle 215 million gallons of sewer 
per day (MGD) and have capacities of 330 MGD and 250 MGD respectively. The 
district will continue to provide compliance oversight and monitor United Water’s 
performance during the contract period. 
The signing of the agreement ended a two-year study that allowed the city to 
determine if it was offering the most cost-efficient services to the customers of the 
district. According to Anne Kinney, executive director with the Milwaukee Sewer 
Department, Milwaukee is notable for its efficient government. Milwaukee is the 17th 
largest city in the United States, but the regional wastewater system is the seventh largest 
and one of the most sophisticated and efficient in the country. Although they were 
operating efficiently, there was always room for improvement. During the Request for 
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Proposal period, Milwaukee received proposals from United Water, Phillips utilities, 
Professional Services Group, and WICOR Energy of Milwaukee. 
In making its decision, the City of Milwaukee had four threshold questions that 
were paramount in the consideration of competitive contracting: 
1. Could a private operator continue the districts unparalleled record of 
environmental performance? 
2. Could a contractor maintain the facilities and equipment in a prudent 
manner? 
3. Would a contractor fairly provide for the needs of district employees 
affected by such an agreement? 
4. If the above conditions were met, would the district achieve meaningful 
cost savings? 
From the standpoint of employment, the city did not seem to be concerned with 
the condition of the employees.18 In the Employee Issues section of the contract, it states 
that in a separate agreement that United Water service agreed that there should be no 
forced layoffs during the term of the contract. United Water services must recognize the 
unions representing district employees and assume collective bargaining agreements. 
United Water Services must maintain the district’s current residency requirement for non- 
represented as well as represented employees in all labor agreements.19 
United Water has hired all district employees at current wages and benefits 
packages. The 280 district employees represent four different collective bargaining units 
along with American Federation of State County and Municipal Employees District 
Council 48, Local 366, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, 
18 Competitive Contract 1998, 4. 
19 United Water, contract with the City of Milwaukee, 1992. 
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District No. 10, Lodge 66, International Union of Operating Engineers Local 317, and 
the Milwaukee Building & Construction Trades Council of the AFL-CIO. Milwaukee’s 
customers were estimated to save in excess of $140 million as a result of the new 
contract. The district currently service 1.2 million residents living in 28 communities 
covering 420 square miles both inside and outside the Milwaukee area. The city 
expected to see a 30 percent reduction in operating costs. Some say that the potential 
cost-savings in describing the contract was the best way to get the job done. The 
operation and maintenance fee paid by the district to United Water services was about 
$29.8 million annually. In its proposal, United Water services Milwaukee LLC 
committed to investing 5 percent of its pre-tax profits in the Milwaukee community.21 
The public water system is one of the newer public services to move towards 
privatization. In the United States, government owned but privately managed water or 
sewer facilities operate a provision of about 20 percent of the drinking water and 2 
percent of the wastewater. Most of the nations water operations remain to be dominated 
by local governments. Privatization has led to competition and usually results in savings 
of at least 22 percent in water treatment cost.22 
The potential growth of the private water companies has gained the attention of 
other industries. One in particular is the electricity providers. When Birmingham 
accepted bids for management of the water system, the plan attracted bids from many 
electric companies. 
20 United Water, Municipal info-Milwaukee fVI (7 December 1998) available from 
http://www.unitedwater.com:80/nss..,5/aaa2Y.vH d35cd&NS-doc-offset= . Internet. 
21 Competitive Contract 1998, 6. 
22 Robert Wessell, “ Privatization in the United States,” Business Economics ("Oct 1995): 46. 
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Through their subsidiaries, companies like Houston Enron, and Atlanta 
Southern Company made offers. The sales of the largest water contract in history until 
that time was being deemed as the premier event in the area of municipal water 
privatization. The interest in Birmingham’s water system from companies such as 
Enron and Southern Co., which owns bidder Alabama Power, was a clear sign that large 
energy companies have set their sights on the water industry. This was happening in 
much the same way that they expanded into the electric business earlier this decade. A 
number of gas companies are also expected to venture into the water industry by either 
buying or taking over the operations of aging municipal water systems. 
There are 60,000 municipally owned water systems in the United States with an 
85 percent market share. The EPA estimates upgrade the current facilities will cost $140 
billion. A similar amount will be required to upgrade the nation’s wastewater systems.23 
Enron, under its water subsidiary Azurix, introduced itself to the water industry 
through its $2.8 billion acquisition of Wessex Water PLC, of the United Kingdom. The 
company signed many international deals and is currently working on a number of 
domestic contracts. Enron is known as an aggressive competitor in the deregulated 
electricity and natural gas businesses. 
This experience operating in a formerly regulated market is what gives Enron as 
well as other large well-financed companies the advantage in dealing with the water 
market. In the past, electric companies never would have looked at the water industry. 
23 Michael Davis, “ Energy companies getting thirsty electric utilities are looking to pour billions 
of dollars into U.S. water systems,” The Houston Chronicle (7 March 1999): 1. 
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Today these companies see the end of their monopoly and they are looking for new 
markets to explore. An example of this is when Philadelphia Suburban Corporation, the 
second-largest private U.S. water utility supplier, stated that at least six electric utilities 
were interested in buying a stake in the company or striking some sort of alliance. Some 
water companies are selling for top dollar due to the new trends in the market, so energy 
companies need to carefully consider if they can turn a profit on such operations. The list 
of water companies that own or manage water operations include DQE, Nipsco 
Industries, a Northern Indiana utility holding company, Duke Energy Corporation, the 
Charlotte, N.C.-based utility giant with large Houston operations; Minnesota Power, a 
Duluth G.A. based utility holding company; and Sierra Pacific Resources, the electric 
utility serving Northern Nevada.24 
Another company who found itself interested in this market was GPU. This 
company owns three nuclear facilities in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. They are the 
previous owners of the Three Mile Island nuclear plant. They are now looking for a more 
stable market such as water.25 
As of November 30, 1998, the largest investor-owned water utility west of the 
Mississippi got larger. California Water Service Group based in San Jose, merged with 
Dominguez Services Corporation Water Company, to provide water services to more 
than 1.5 million people in California, including 19,000 homes in Santa Clara Valley, 
while Dominguez has 140,000 customers around the Golden State.26 
24
 Davis 1999, 2. 
25 Davis 1999,3. 
26 Delevett Peter, “Water utility companies merge, form industry powerhouse; CA Water Service 
Co.;Dominguez Service Corp.,” The Business Journal, (30 November, 1998):2. 
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The merged company will retain the California Water name and maintain its 
headquarters in San Jose. It is the largest merger of investor-owned utilities in California 
history. “The increased clout and economies of scale will help California Water land 
bids to privatize municipal water systems,” said Jim Good, Vice-President of Corporate 
Communications. Officials expect the merged entity to post annual revenue in excess of 
$200 million. California Water grossed $185 million for the 12 months ending on 
September 30, 1998, while Dominguez grossed $26 million over the same period. The 
deal was structured as a tax-free exchange of California Water shares for all outstanding 
shares of Dominguez. The shares were valued at more than $47 million. As of 
November 13, 1998, California Water also acquired the smaller company’s outstanding 
debts of $10.5 million.27 
Another California-based company prospering in the private water industry is 
U.S. Filter. In addition to water treatment, U.S. Filter also has divisions that distribute 
bottled water and design industrial systems. U.S. Filter watched revenues grow from 
$147 million in 1994, to $3.2 billion in 1999. Profits have gone from $5 million five 
years ago, to $106 million last year. 
In addition to some of the domestic companies vying for position in this newly 
formed market, there are many foreign companies whom are competing for municipal 
water contracts.28 Large contractors, especially some French and British firms, have 
displayed substantial engineering and operating experience as opposed to the limited 
backgrounds of small governments. Cie Gerrale des Eaux and Lyonnaise des Eaux- 
Dumex have worldwide revenues of $25 billion, respectively, and have fought over water 
27 Delevett 1998, 6. 
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contracts from Kuala Lumpar to Buenos Aires. Some of these contracts were valued at 
sums exceeding $1 billion. Of the seven largest firms vying for this type of contract in 
the United States, four have British or French origin. They sometimes operate through 
local subsidiaries. A substantial market for domestic firms obviously exists, the United 
Water Company is also a foreign owned subsidiary of the French firm Lyonnaise des 
Eaux-Dumex. 
Throughout the 1960s America underwent some social and cultural changes that 
had an impact on their ability to improve the quality of life for blacks, especially the 
black middle class. The sixties was a time of migration, protest, and expansion. 
This period brought personal and cultural self-affirmation in which blacks began 
to re-envision America as a place of economic opportunity. The massive movement of 
black people toward the attainment of civil rights and equal opportunities was met with 
resistance throughout the country. This movement of blacks to the middle class and the 
election of blacks to public office were quite important advancements during this period. 
Despite the existence of a few businesses owned by middle-class blacks that catered to 
specific needs within their communities, black urbanities could not amass sufficient 
capital or gain the necessary managerial experience to effect the creation of, or their 
advancement within, large-scale business enterprises. The expansion of the black 
middle-class in the sixties also brought with it a heightened concern among blacks within 
the race consciousness. Cornell West referred to this as an anxiety-ridden middle class in 
racist America. This anxiety-ridden class reflected the fear felt by many newly arrived 
28 Davis 1998, 4. 
43 
members of the black bourgeoisie. They feared falling prey to what in recent years had 
been popularly referred to as “whitening up.”29 
Today, society is experiencing an attack on the black middle class. The obstacles 
for black achievement are greater now than they were before. The community structure 
is so divided that blacks are left without a unified defense against institutional racism. 
The problem is escalated by the mere fact that some blacks are currently leading the 
charge against legislation that is beneficial to members of their own race. Blacks who are 
members of the middle class are not supportive of lower-income black that are striving to 
access wealth. Some of the legislation that the black municipal administrators are 
implementing has the possibility of being a tool to reciprocate the gains achieved by 
black municipal employees and give power to the private sector. 
At the turn of the century, the Progressive movement stressed a modernized local 
government in the United States. At the same time, Frederick Taylor (1856-1915) 
wanted to bring the advantages of “ Scientific Management” techniques, which worked 
successfully in many private sector organizations, to the public sector. 
In the past forty years there have been concerted efforts to directly involve the 
private sector in public water service delivery. Since 1955, the national government has 
issued a series of directives urging its agencies, as a matter of policy, to look to the 
private sector before initiating any efforts to provide a commercial product or service if 
the product or service can be procured more economically from the private sector.30 
29 Cose Ellis, The Rage of a privileged class (New York: Harpers Collins, 1993), 24-28. 
30 Albert 1996, 4. 
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During that same period, scholars, and policy makers began to differentiate 
among the provisions of public services and the production of those services. Provisions 
are defined as decisions made about gathering funds in a community and how those funds 
will be allocated. Production is the actual delivery of products or services. The 
distinction between provision and production opened up a whole spectrum of possibilities 
for government decision-makers. This also created a variety of opportunities for public- 
private partnerships including private contracts, franchises, vouchers, and full 
privatization, hi order for the system to be effective the government must completely 
abandon the product or service to the private marketplace. 
A growing federal deficit and the Gramm-Rudman-Holings Act created another 
kind of incentive for privatization during the 1980s. Politicians recognized that 
expenditures could be placed off-budget by channeling them through quasi-governmental 
agencies like the Federal National Mortgage Association. During the 1980s the number 
of these government-sponsored enterprises was greatly expanded.31 By the end of the 
1980s sales of state enterprises had reached $185 billion worldwide. In 1990 alone 
there were $25 billion sold in state-owned enterprises worldwide. 
Some attribute the pressure towards privatization to the persistence of social 
problems and technical dilemmas that have defied public sector solutions. Cities with 
increasing high school dropout rates, deteriorating public-transit dilapidated public 
housing, environmental pollution, and hazardous waste disposal are problems that 
undermine faith in the ability of the public sector. There are two major catalysts for 
31 Albert 1996, 9. 
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privatization: people who opposed growth in the public sector and proponents of 
32 private operations as being more efficient. 
In January 1996, the Reason Foundation released a report entitled “Re-structuring 
America’s Water Industry: Comparing Investor-Owned and Government-Owned Water 
Systems” in which the authors of the report concluded that, California and other states 
should adopt policies which encourage the termination of government production of 
water service. However, many services are not suitable for privatization and many forms 
of privatization do not require the termination of government involvement. 
The adversaries of privatization are predominantly public employee 
organizations. According to the Congressional Budget Office: 
Public employee organizations view contracting out as a backdoor device for 
doing away with federal jobs. They argue that changes in the size of the 
work force or its compensation should be made directly though pay and 
program reform. Some critics argue that the savings from contracting out are 
bought at the price of making the government party to substandard 
employment practices in certain firms. They also believe that when agencies 
contract out, they are substituting work performed by private firms that may 
employ inexperienced workers and that may have loyalties tom by the 
competing demands of agencies, other customers, and boards of directors.33 
In 1972, local capital spending for wastewater treatment was up to $5 billion. As 
federal funding increased, the real local expenditures fell to $1 billion per year.34 
According to Robert Levy, the government cut every dollar of federal spending that went 
32 Albert 1996, 4 
33 U.S. Congressional Budget Office, “Efficient Investment in Wastewater Treatment Plants,” 
(June 1985): 4-5. 
34 U.S. Congressional Budget Office 1985, 5. 
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toward wastewater treatment, which cities began to slash their own by spending 70 
cents on the dollar.35 
Local municipalities only paid 25 percent of the construction costs for federally 
funded wastewater projects. Total costs were at least 30 percent higher than what local 
governments paid the costs entirely themselves. Many cities paid such a small share of 
the cost, they built expensive facilities with far greater capacity than their communities 
could ever handle.36 This would later have a detrimental effect on many cities, causing 
them to have to explore other ways to finance the upgrading of their wastewater system. 
In 1981 an estimated 90 percent of the plants built with federal money did not meet the 
national clean water standards.37 
In 1987, Congress passed the Water Quality Act, which terminated the funds for 
wastewater treatment in 1990, and made state construction revolving funds. Under this 
program states had more freedom over how to spend funds allowing municipalities to 
tailor facilities to cater to their needs. 
By the end of 1994, federal funding for water plant improvement ceased.38 Any 
responsible privatization examination has to also consider the factors that contribute to 
this system. Some attribute the pressure toward privatization to the persistence of social 
problems and technical dilemmas that have defied public sector solutions. 
35 Jondrow, James and Levy, “The Displacement of Local Spending for Pollution Control by 
Federal Construction Grants, The American Economic Review, ( May 1984): 174-8. 
36 General Accounting Office, “Costly Wastewater Plants Fail to Perform As Expected,” 1980. 
37 Randall, FitzGerald, “Rebuilding Our Infrastructure, ” When Government Goes Private (New 
York: Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy) Report prepared by the Institute, 1988. 
38 Congressional Budget Office “The Federal Budget for Public Works Infrastructure,” 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 1985), 64. 
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Some say that increasing high school dropout rates, deteriorating public transit, 
dilapidated public housing, environmental pollution, and hazardous wastes disposal as 
problems that undermine faith in the ability of the public sector. Despite automobile 
recalls, cost overruns by defense contractors, and low private-sector productivity growth 
during the last decade, the belief persists—even among public officials—that the private 
sector could more efficiently carry out many of the productive activities of the public 
39 sector. 
Water supply has some technical special characteristics that make it difficult to 
introduce the competitive environment that has been implemented in other industries. 
Large-scale interconnection is not feasible. Water’s status as a public resource and the 
ownership of water rights also discourage the entrance of competitors in this market.40 
In many instances, the saving realized from privatizing water has come from 
cutting jobs. In the most widely publicized case, Indianapolis, the work force fell form 
328 to 205 shortly after privatization. If there was featherbedding and waste, then those 
job cuts are less relevant. If there is a decrement in the amount and quality of service, 
then the job cuts are germane. The costs savings are clear, but the jury is still out 
regarding service effectiveness.41 
Successful privatization has to address such questions regarding the goals and 
objectives? What forms of privatization, if any, are appropriate? Will the service be 
performed in an adequately competitive environment? 
39 Bozeman Barry “Privatization Guidelines,” A report prepared for the Atlanta City counsel, 26 
Georgia Technical Institute, March 1997, 1-7. 
40 American Metropolitan Sewer Association 1997, 15. 
41 Gilbert, Nick “Does Water Flow Uphill?” Financial World, (November 1994,): 22-25. 
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If not, can regulation provide sufficient safeguards and control? How can 
accountability and quality control be maintained? If the private firm fails, what recourse, 
and responsibility, does government have? 
The other checklist asks whether privatization is legal for a particular service? 
What is the impact on the public sector employment? If the effort fails, can government 
easily regain the skills and equipment needed to resume public production? Can 
government powers, such as eminent domain, be transferred to or used on behalf of 
private companies?42 
42 Albert 1996, 3. 
CHAPTER III 
THE POLITICAL SETTING: FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE NEED TO 
PRIVATIZE THE PUBLIC WATER SYSTEM IN ATLANTA 
When doing research on a geographical boundary, it is necessary to have a 
demographic profile and a historical background of the area being studied. The 
demographic information for this paper was extracted from the Atlanta Regional 
Commission and the 1990 U.S. Census. The following tables give a representation of the 
race, population, sex, educational attainment, and household income of the people living 
in Atlanta. 
The racial makeup of the City of Atlanta is unlike any other city in the Southeast. 
Blacks have a strong political and economic presence in this area. This first table shows 
the racial profile of Atlanta. 




American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut 626 
Asian or Pacific Islander 3,327 
Other Race 3,488 
Source: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1990. 
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When giving the demographic of any city it is important to examine the 
educational attainment of the different racial groups in the city. Although Atlanta has a 
large population of educated blacks, they still lag far behind whites in educational 
achievement. The following tables give an empirical depiction of the educational 
achievement of the people in Atlanta. 
Table 2. Educational Attainment by Race 
Race/Educational Attainment Population 
Black 
Less than 9th grade 21,344 
High School no Diploma 39,530 
High School Graduate 44,821 
College no degree 23,062 
Associates Degree 5,877 
Bachelor’s Degree 10,259 
Graduate or professional degree 6,488 
White 
Less than 9lh grade 5,015 
High school no diploma 7,233 
High school graduate 12,422 
College no degree 15,978 
Associates Degree 3,812 
Bachelor’s Degree 30,212 
Graduate or Professional Degree 44,821 
Native American, Eskimo, or Aleut 
Less than 9th grade 33 
High School no Diploma 73 
High School Graduate 113 
College no Degree 91 
Associate Degree 37 
Bachelor’s Degree 48 
Graduate or Professional Degree 89 
Source: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1990. 
The household income of blacks is significantly lower than that of whites. This 
disproves the belief that blacks receive a comparable portion of the wealth in Atlanta. 
The following table shows the household income of different racial groups in the city. 
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Table 3. Household Income 
Race/Income Population 
Blacks 
Less than $5,000 19,175 
$10,000 or $14,999 25 
$15,000 or $24,999 64 
$25,000 or $34,999 18 
$35,000 or $49,999 42 
$50,000 or $74,999 5 
$100,000 or more 21 
White 
Less than $5,000 3,452 
$5,000 to $9,999 4,413 
$10,000 to $14,999 4,291 
$15,000 to $24,999 9,096 
$25,000 to $34,999 7,973 
$35,000 to $49,999 9,223 
$50,000 to $74,999 9,241 
$100,000 or more 8,991 
Asian or Pacific Islander 
Less than $5000 262 
$5,000 to $9,999 107 
$10,000 to $14,999 137 
$15,000 to $24,999 121 
$25,000 to $34,999 83 
$35,000 to $49,999 148 
$50,000 to $74,999 127 
$100,000 or more 47 
Source: United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1990. 
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Tables 4 and 5 address the housing situation in Atlanta. There is a problem 
with the accuracy of the data because of the constant change in dynamics in the City of 
Atlanta. These tables give an idea of the housing situation in Atlanta. 
Table 4. Number of households and average household size in Atlanta 
Year Households HH Size 
1980 162,553 2.51 
1990 155,752 2.40 
1998 167,977 2.36 
Source: Atlanta Regional Commission 1998 
Table 5. Housing Units by type 1998 








Source: Atlanta Regional Commission 1998 
The population in the City of Atlanta in 1997 was 429,725 blacks and other races 
accounted for 68.6 percent of the total population. 
History of Atlanta 
The City of Atlanta was established in 1837, when the Western & Atlantic 
Railroad extended its tracks from Tennessee to Georgia and named the end of the line 
Terminus. Before that time, some say that the city came from Fort Peachtree, where 
Peachtree Creek flows into the Chattahoochee River. In 1814, Americans built Fort 
Peachtree to watch over their neighborhoods during the War of 1812. The fort was later 
reconstructed by the Water Department, which today operates a water quality monitoring 
station. In 1845, the City name was changed to Atlanta, derived from the name of the 
railroad that gave birth to the city. 
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Often referred to as the “Black Mecca,” the City of Atlanta has a rich history of 
black progress in the south. The 1850 Census recorded the population in Atlanta at 
2,058 whites, 18 free blacks, and 493 slaves. Among the main jobs were 70 carpenters, 
38 merchants, 11 clerks, 10 farmers, 10 grocers, and 8 clergymen. In 1851, there were 
still slave uprisings in Atlanta. Even then Atlanta was considered to be a growing city. 
In 1856, the population had grown to 8,000 and the city began to establish itself as a 
major city with the growth of the railroads and the formation of such major companies 
like the Atlanta Gas Light Company. 
The early 1900s were a period of massive gains in the city of Atlanta. Coca- 
Cola’s Atlanta Bottling Company was licensed by Coca-Cola to bottle the beverage 
locally. That was the time that it began operations in Atlanta. The Atlanta Federal 
Penitentiary opened in 1901. In that same year, Atlanta had its first black newspaper 
called The Independent. In 1905, Alonzo Herndon, a former slave and ex-barber, started 
the Atlanta Life Insurance Company. Herndon is Atlanta’s first black millionaire. In 
1909, Atlanta gained a new black owned bank with the formation of Atlanta State 
Savings Bank. By 1910, Atlanta recorded a population of 154,839, with a 33.5 percent 
black population. 
This was also a time of social change, in 1902 there was a race riot called the 
“Pittsburgh Riot.” This altercation left three policemen, two blacks and one white 
civilian dead. 1906 brought about another four days of race rioting that left ten blacks 
and two whites dead. The riot began after a gubernatorial campaign in which one 
candidate, Hoke Smith, promised to take away the black vote. He later became governor 
of Georgia. 
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Another period of constant growth was the 1960s. Blacks gained access to 
facilities and rights that their predecessors could only dream about. In 1961, the 
Chamber of Commerce and black leaders announced an agreement that would end 
segregation in Atlanta Public Schools. Nine black youth integrated four predominantly 
white schools. In 1963, the integrating of predominately white schools started on the 
collegiate level, with the Georgia Institute of Technology admitting three black students. 
Other schools that began to accept blacks were Agnes Scott, Atlanta Speech School, 
Dekalb Area Trade Schools, Emory University, Oglethorpe University, Smith Hughes 
Vocational School, and Trinity Presbyterian. Georgia State College followed in 1965. 
With the rise of leaders like Martin Luther King, and Ralph David Abernathy, 
Atlanta was beginning to be the southern HUB for the civil rights movement. The city 
gained recognition for the works of Dr. W.E.B DuBois and other students and scholars 
attending the Atlanta University Center, which at that time was comprised of Atlanta 
University, Clark College, Morris Brown College, Morehouse College, and Spelman 
College. The “Bum Baby Bum” speech given by H. Rap Brown and the conferences 
headed by Dr. DuBois, gave Atlanta a race consciousness like no other southern city in 
America.1 
Since that time, Atlanta has had three black mayors, totaling 24 years of black 
leadership. Under black mayors, the city of Atlanta has built the second largest airport in 
the country, hosted the 1996 Olympic games, and now serves as the home to many 
Fortune 500 companies, such as United Parcel Service and Delta Airlines. 
1 City of Atlanta, A Short History of Atlanta, (17 Feb 1999) available from http://www.citv- 
directorv.com/Overview/history/historvl.htm. Internet. 
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Between 1990 and 1998, the City of Atlanta gained 10,800 residents, a 2.4 percent 
increase. In 1998, there were a total of 426,600 residents in the City of Atlanta. As of 
1998, 68.0 percent of the City of Atlanta’s population was black, Asian, or Hispanic. In 
1997, there were 418,321 jobs in the City of Atlanta.2 
The City of Atlanta Water System provides water to approximately one million 
people, an average of 124 million gallons of water per day to approximately 650,000 
retail customers. The City of Atlanta also sells water wholesale to the cities like 
Hapeville, Forest Park, Union City, and Fairbum as well as to Clayton County and 
Fayette County. The City of Atlanta Water Treatment Plants and their capacities include: 
• Chattahochee Complex- capacity of 60 million gallons of water per-day: 
no raw water storage. 
• Hemphill Complex- capacity of 130 million gallons per day usable raw 
water storage of 498 million gallons. Distributions of treated water are by 
2,446 of water mains. 
The Metropolitan Atlanta area has experienced some tremendous growth 
throughout the last ten years. In 1990, the 10-county Atlanta Region was home to 2.6 
million people and 900,000 jobs. In 1998, the region was home to 3.1 million 
people and increase of 21.6 percent in eight years. The region’s 1997-1998 population 
increase of 77,200, while smaller than the record 105,500 levels of 1994-1995, is still 
well above the average annual increase since 1980. 
Fulton County is still the largest of the region’s 10 counties, 773,300 residents in 
1998. DeKalb County ranks second with 598,600, followed by Cobb at 550,100 and 
Gwinnett County at 499,200. During the first eight years of the 1990s, Gwinnett County 
2 City of Atlanta, A Short History of Atlanta, (1 May 1999) available from, http://www.atlanta- 
data/.com/viewPaae.asp/TemolateTvpe=&TemplateRecordID=82- Internet. 
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added 142,700 new residents to lead the region in net population increase. Fulton 
ranked second with an increase of 102,500 and Cobb was third, up 96,700. Together, 
these three counties account for nearly two-thirds of the region’s population increase 
since 1990. 
The regions’ housing stock has increased by 228,573 or 17.9 percent, since 1990. 
In 1998, two of every three units were single-family, with multi-family units accounting 
for only 21 percent of the region’s housing unit increase since 1990. In 1997, there were 
1.8 million jobs in the Atlanta Region. Between 1996 and 1997, the Atlanta Region 
added 68,000 new jobs. While trailing the record growth of 1994-1995 (73,000 new 
jobs), this increase still exceeded the 1990-1997 annual averages of 49,714 new jobs.3 
The wastewater treatment capacity of Atlanta’s four wastewater treatment plants 
is 176 million gallons per day. The system is currently an average of 148 million gallons 
per day, with the R. M. Clayton Plant treating 60 percent of the total volume. 
The central part of Atlanta, about 26 square miles, has a combined store and 
sanitary sewer system that is over 100 years old. Outside the central city, the sanitary 
sewer and storm drainage system is separate, but the entire system is old and in need of 
improvement. State and federal mandates for the control, treatment or elimination of 
combined sewer overflows and for reduction of phosphorus discharge into the 
Chattaoochee River, have made the correction of the problems critical. The city’s water 
and sewer infrastructure is very old and badly in need of modernization. 
Fulton County began contracting out the operation and maintenance of two 
wastewater treatment plants, Big Creek and Little River, and related pump stations on 
3 Atlanta Regional Commission Report, (12 June 1998) available from www.atlreg.com. Internet. 
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June 3, 1992 with JMM Operational Services, Inc. The initial term of the agreement 
was four years with a one-year extension. The first two years of the contract have 
resulted in savings to Fulton County of approximately $4 million, a 50 percent savings. 
Full privatization should enable the county to achieve 75 percent of the savings at the Big 
Creek Plant, or approximately $940,000 a year.4 
In the 1970s, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued Atlanta a 
mandate to clean up the Chattachoochee River. The Georgia Environmental Protection 
Division (EPD) followed the EPA’s lead by starting its own investigation into the sewer 
problem in Atlanta. 
The state EPA division imposed a $20,000 per day fine on Atlanta for missing 
mandated cleanup deadlines and having too much unwanted element-phosphorus in the 
city’s wastewater.5 The state also added an additional $750,000 a month fine for similar 
violations.6 Mayor Bill Campbell attributed the extreme problem to 100 years of neglect 
on the part of prior administrations. Campbell believed that the water and sewer 
problems were ignored for decades, but the city was making progress in making the long 
needed improvements. In an address given by the mayor, he stated that he believed 
privatization would be applied after careful analysis. He gave three reasons why this was 
the best method for the city. First, there was the billion dollars immediate improvements 
needed in order to bring the treatment centers to EPA and EPD standards. 
4 Fulton County Advisory Board, “Fulton County Citizens” Advisory Board on Consolidation and 
Privatization Commission Report, 2 March 1995. 
5 Weems, Christopher. “Nature and Governments in dirty fight over Atlanta’s Unclean 
Wastewater System,” Atlanta Inquirer. 17 March 1997, 1. 
6 Environmental Protection Division Issues Order to The City of Atlanta” Columbus Times 7 
Nov. 1995, A5. 
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Next, privatization would raise money without placing undue financial strain on the 
residents of the city. Lastly, he saw privatization as a means whereby the city could 
address a serious problem without distracting from other pressing management needs. 
Mayor Campbell predicted that without the implementation of an effective privatization 
plan, the users of the city’s water system would be forced to bear a tremendous financial 
burden. The customer's water and sewer rate was projected to rise from $39.50 to $59.40 
per month. Given the large numbers of elderly and low-income residents living in 
Atlanta, such an increase would be dramatic.7 
Pipeline problems created one of the first crises in Campbell’s administration. 
Campbell says that they were being held liable for correcting a problem that time, nature, 
and lack of action in previous administration caused.8 
In 1997, Senator Nadine Thomas of the Georgia legislature put forth a proposal 
entitled SB 318-Water system management. This legislation would permit local 
government to enter into a long-term contract for the management of its water/sewer 
system. It tried to allow the City of Atlanta the opportunity to explore every option 
available in managing its water system and come up with the most cost effective 
measure. At that time, there was a law prohibiting one government from binding the 
revenues of future administrations. The private management of a municipality’s water 
system could call for a 30-40 year contract in order to gain the most cost effective 
7 Campbell Bill “Why I believe privatization is the right thing to do” Editorial, Atlanta Journal 
Constitution. 22 Aug 1998. 
8 Weems Christopher, “Nature and Governments in dirty fight over Atlanta’s Unclean Wastewater 
System,’ Atlanta Inquirer. January 1998, 1. 
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savings. Thus, state law could be narrowly tailored to allow for private management of 
local water/sewer system. There was a precedent for that kind of approach. State law 
allowed local governments to enter into long-term contracts for the management of zoos, 
botanical gardens, and libraries. The authors of the proposal believed that it was time to 
take such measures in relation to the water system. 
The Administration believed that recently changed federal tax guidelines would 
now allow municipalities to enter into long-term contracts. This would allow the city to 
enjoy tremendous savings in the management of the water systems. Without savings 
enjoyed by the private management, the city was facing the prospect of an 81 percent rate 
increase over the next four years to fund required capitol improvement projects in water 
treatment facilities. 
The Mayor’s office explained that the savings would occur due to the fact that 
private sector uses cutting edge technology that saves money, time, and manpower. They 
are also able to “buy in bulk” the necessary parts and equipment for the treatment plants.9 
9 Thomas Nadine, “SD 318 Water Systems Management” Proposal before GA State Legislature, 
26 February 1997. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS PRIVATIZATION OF THE PUBLIC 
WATER SYSTEM IN ATLANTA 
As mentioned earlier, this movement toward privatization originated with a 100- 
year sewer problem. Mayor Campbell said that privatization would negate most of an 81 
percent, four-year increase in sewer rates. Campbell believed that privatization was 
implemented so he could reduce those rates to a 14 percent increase in one year. A 
proposed increase in water bills for commercial users would be dropped.1 2 
Campbell’s plan was to use the cost savings of privatizing the water system to pay 
for most of the needed anti-pollution upgrades. The Atlanta City Council commissioned a 
study of the sewer system for $382,000 Brown and Caldwell located in Walnut Creek, 
California. In December 8, 1997, the city announced its decision to privatize. The 
Brown and Caldwell recommended eight alternatives ranging from light reengineering 
and outsourcing to competitive selection of a private management firm. The mayor 
considered privatization the best decision for Atlanta. The city still had to issue $180 
million in bonds to finance improvements that year to complete the combined sewer 
2 
overflow system required by the state law. 
1 Helton, Charmagne, “Mayor urges privatization of water, sewer systems” Atlanta Journal 
Constitution. 7 Feb 1997, 02C. 
2 Campos Carlos, “Mayor Likely to sign legislation on Atlanta’s water system bids ” Atlanta 
Journal Constitution. 5 March 1998, Local News 06. 
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In March of 1998, Mayor Campbell signed legislation to solicit bids from 
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private companies to operate Atlanta’s water system. 
Mayor Campbell was pleased with council’s approval of a $1.6 million plan to 
hire a consultant to help the city devise a request for private companies to operate the 
water department. Although they agreed to the hiring of a consulting firm, council could 
not agree on the sufficient amount to pay a lawyer. This was just the beginning of a 
struggle over the implementation of the water system. A major point of contention was 
the quarrel over the oversight of the privatization process between Mayor Campbell and 
city council. The council felt that they should have more involvement in the bidding 
process. Provisions to allow council members to oversee the selection process and 
monitor contract execution do not appear in the request for proposal process. 
Councilwoman Clair Muller was one of the council members was very vociferous 
about council’s position in the privatization process. Others, such as Thomas Weyandt of 
Research Atlanta and Barry Bozeman from Georgia Tech, found other problems with the 
request for proposal system. It did not spell out how the city would monitor the contract. 
It also failed to specify who would be responsible for millions of dollars in capital 
improvement. 
Many experts also questioned the RFP’s point system for evaluating bidders: 
Cost-effectiveness (30 points), quality of technical approach (20 points), quality of 
management team (20 points), equal business opportunity plans (15 points), employee 
relations and transition plan (10 points) and performance capabilities (5 points). 
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Bozeman was surprised at the rank of performance since it included the bidder’s 
history with such contracts.3 
Atlanta received five bidders who submitted technical and financial qualifications. 
The five companies were U.S. Filter Operating Services Incorporated, United Water 
Services, Operational Management International Incorporated, Atlanta Water 
Corporation, and the Atlanta Water Alliance. All five bidders included between one and 
four minority firms among their primary partnership in the proposed operation. After 
receiving their confirmation letters the bidders were qualified to present their ideas for 
improving the city’s water system. Table 6 shows the scores given to bidders along with 
proposed costs after the first phase of bidding. 
Table 6. Scores and Dollar Amounts after First Phase of Bidding Process 
Company  Score  Cost (dollars, millions) 
OMI/Atlanta 85.7 $27.6 
Atlanta Water Alliance 81.2 29.8 
United Water 79.9 27 
U.S Filter 71.5 25 
Atlanta Water Corp. 66.6 31.5 
Source: Carlos Campos and Julie Hairston, “Privatization process meets 
confusion” Atlanta Journal Constitution, Metro Final Today’s News, 29 July 1998, 02B. 
The bidding process turned into a power struggle that some deemed as more of a 
political process than one involving the merit or capabilities of the companies. Although 
the RFP guidelines included several prohibitions against contacts between city employees 
and potential bidders, or the bidders representatives, it allowed the former city Chief of 
3 Campos Carlos, “Wading into private waters; Atlanta’s plan for utility still murky” Atlanta 
Journal Constitution. 27 March 1998, News: 1. 
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Staff Steven J. Labovitz, now an attorney with the city’s legal consultant on 
privatization Long, Aldridge & Norman, to sit with the selection panel as it deliberated. 
Labovitz’s wife, Sherri S. Labovitz, is an attorney with the law firm Minkin & Snyder, 
which represented the bidder Operations Management International Incorporated (OMI). 
Operations Management International Incorporated was also known to be major 
contributors to the Campbell campaign; it would not be unreasonable to presume that 
OMI had an unfair advantage as it relates to the bidding process. 
Another company who engaged in the political fight was U.S. Filter. U.S. Filter 
partnered with Urban Environmental Solutions whose president is Shirley Clarke 
Franklin. Franklin worked for the city in a variety of capacities throughout the 1970s and 
80s, ultimately serving as chief administrator in the Jackson and Young administration.4 
Andrew Young also has ties to the Metro Group, which is a 35-member group that 
formed a self-appointed watchdog task force monitoring the privatization process of 
Atlanta’s water system. Along with former Mayor Andrew Young, the group also 
includes former Mayor Sam Massell, Woodruff Foundation President Charles H. McTier, 
and other prominent attorneys and businessmen throughout Metro-Atlanta. This group 
was very vocal throughout the entire privatization process. Considering the way bidding 
the process was set up, they believed it was quite possible that the company with the 
highest bid, could still win. 
4 Julie Hairston, “Privatization bids under scrutiny” Atlanta Journal Constitution 4 Aug 1998, 
Local News: 06B. 
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George Heery, Chairman of the Metro Group said that his group had concerns 
that the city was not working toward a deal that would produce the greatest savings for 
Atlanta’s water rate payers. The group alleged that the city’s process for selecting a 
company left the door wide open for cronyism and corruption. They also criticized the 
criteria used to weigh the bidders. 
The contract was finally awarded to United Water Services who was not immune 
to its own strategy to engage in this political contest. They hired several former City Hall 
employees to put its bid proposal together. Marva Jones Brooks, a former city attorney 
under Mayors Maynard Jackson and Andrew Young, was hired as one of the company’s 
lawyers. 
Michael Sullivan was brought in to help the United Water team design the City of 
Atlanta’s Affirmative Action plan. He is a former contract Compliance Director for the 
City. He helped United Water in fulfilling the 30-percent minority requirement for their 
bid. 
Pelham Wiliams, co-owner of Williams-Russell and Johnson, was once the City’s 
commissioner of environment and streets. Williams’s partner, Charles Johnson, served as 
the water department’s chief water department engineer. Phyllis Fraley, United Water’s 
public relations consultant, worked as director of communications during Jackson’s third 
term. So, United Water’s bid team was filled with former Jackson cabinet employees 
whom had a working relationship with the current mayor. 
City Workers Dissuaded as Bidders 
Some of the city workers had 32 years of experience and knowledge working in 
the city water system. They were fully aware of the areas of cost savings and how to 
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improve water quality and service delivery. Some were interested in demonstrating 
their ability and dedication by taking part in the bidding process on the privatization 
contract. Mayor Campbell told the water employees that each bid proposal would require 
a minimum net worth of $600 million dollars in order to considered for review by the 
city. With this information in mind, the employees did not form a corporation or attempt 
to become involved in the bidding process. 
Although Resolution 98-R-0527 legislated that the City would encourage 
employees to compete with private bidders, the City failed to include water workers in 
the bidding process. The information given by the mayor regarding the net worth 
requirement was both misleading, and calculated to prevent experienced city employees 
from forming their own corporation to bid on the privatization proposal. 
The actual proposal involving privatization identified only $50,000.00 as a 
qualification fee, a $1,000,000.00 proposal bond, and financial culpability statement 
showing $100 million net worth or a guarantor with this net worth requirement. The 
$600 million figures were never required in order to bid on the privatization contract. 
With this in mind, the water workers believed that the whole privatization process 
should be declared invalid and the bidding process reopened to all interested entities, 
including the current water workers. 
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Table 7. Final results of proposal evaluation 
Company 10-year contract 20-vear contract 
United Water $23.3 million $21.4 million 
Atlanta Water Alliance $25.3 million $23.2 million 
OMI Atlanta $26.8 million $25.9 million 
U.S. Filter $24 million $22.7 million 
Source: Carlos Campos and Julie Hairston, “United Water a Selection” Atlanta 
Journal Constitution. 28 August 1998, Local News; 06D. 
In deciding whether or not privatization will benefit the city workers we must first 
examine a preceding case whereby another city implemented the same system that the 
city of Atlanta is now executing. 
Denver 
In Denver, the Water Department was eliminated as part of a reduction in 
workforce. John Theis, Jr., brought civil action after he was released. He alleged that 
his procedural and substantive due rights were violated. 
Theis was a classified employee of the water department from April 2,1973 
through October 14, 1994, and served as Superintendent of Transmission and 
Distribution from 1976 to 1989. He was transferred to the newly- created position of 
Assistant to the Executive Director of Operations in October 1989, because of his alleged 
problems in supervising employees. He had no supervisory responsibilities in the new 
position. 
On August 31, 1993, Theis’s manager sent a letter to Theis proposing that 
effective December 31, 1994, Theis would either have to leave the City of Denver as an 
employee or he would receive compensation. Theis’s manager allegedly encouraged him 
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to speak with division directors in the water department about whether they needed 
him. He also urged him to apply for any job vacancies for which he was qualified. 
Denver made a board that was responsible for implementing a cost containment 
effort in 1994. This was a result of actual and projected revenue shortfalls in the water 
department. A ten-member sub-committee was made up of two water board 
commissioners, a manager, and seven division directors in the department. They were 
charged with the task of developing cost containment proposals and made 
recommendations to the City Council. One of the sub-committee’s recommendations 
was the elimination of approximately fifty jobs in the water department through 
termination and attrition. Theis’s supervisor told him in a telephone conversation on June 
17, 1994, that he expected Theis’s position to be eliminated. The Board accepted the 
recommendations and instructed the department to begin implementation. 
Theis and six other water department employees were terminated and forty-three 
additional positions were eliminated through attrition.5 The framework of the plan that 
was implemented resembles the situation enforced in Atlanta. 
Law Suit by City Water Workers of Atlanta 
The Theis case in Denver gave the City of Atlanta leverage as they were forced to 
answer the allegations brought forth by 250 water employees in a court of law. 
The plaintiffs consisted of employees working in the Atlanta water system with 
11/2 to 32 years of prior dedicated service and experience. The plaintiffs were going to be 
separated or terminated from their respective City positions with a loss of accrued 
pensions, compensatory time, sick time, and health benefits. This was part of the 
5 Theis v. City of Denver United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit (D.C. No. 95-Z-349) 
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consequences of the City of Atlanta entering a twenty-year contract to privatize the 
water system. The city agreed to follow strict ordinances and regulations in attempting to 
dismiss, terminate, or separate these plaintiffs without cause from their civil service 
positions. The plaintiffs hired McKinney and Frolich, Attomeys-at-Law to represent 
them. 
All the employees donated $100 a piece to pay for the legal fees, they had no 
financial help from the Union. The plaintiffs asserted that the privatization of a 
governmental function was illegal, unconstitutional, and the Senate Bill 318 sponsored by 
the city, which authorized privatization, was not passed by the Georgia legislature; 
therefore, present attempts at privatization are ultra vires and void. The plaintiffs also 
claimed that they were protected from unlawful termination because, City Code Section 
114-376, which identifies seven specific types of separation and/or termination 
authorized by the City Code as follows: 
1. Resignation 
2. Termination 
3. Layoff or reduction in force 
4. Disability 
5. Dismissal or discharge 
6. Retirement 
7. Death 
The plaintiffs strongly desired to continue their employment with the 
City of Atlanta and receive future accrued pension rights, health benefits, sick time, and 
compensatory time earned by virtue of their prior and past employment with the City. On 
September 25, 1998, the City issued a document entitled “Water Contract Management 
Comprehensive Question and Answer Session to Respond to the Concerns of the 
Plaintiffs.” It asserted that employment with the City would terminate when the contract 
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became effective in October or November of that year. Employees would no longer 
have civil service protection. If an employee refuses to be employed by the contractor, 
he or she would have no preferential placement rights for any city vacancies. The city 
will not declare a reduction in force to protect employees. Employees who refuse 
employment with the contractor would lose accrued sick leave and other benefit. 
Employees who request a refund of the accrued pension amounts from the City would 
only receive their prior contribution and interest and would forfeit all further rights to a 
pension with the city. Employees who refuse to retire before transition to the private 
contractor would not receive health, life, and dental insurance benefits upon retirement. 
For example, plaintiff Paul Tourand would lose $1,154.10 per month from his monthly 
pension if he is forced to retire, for a total loss of $13,849.20 per year for the remainder 
of his life.6 
6 Said Abedi, et al. vs City of Atlanta and Atlanta City Council, Fulton County Superior Court, 
File 1998, CV 00374. 
CHAPTER V 
IMPACT OF PRIVATIZATION ON THE BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS CITY 
WORKERS OF ATLANTA 
Chapter 5 presents the different perspectives as it relates to privatization in the 
City of Atlanta. There were many opposing forces throughout this whole process. Some 
still oppose the system and see it as nothing more than an ominous system for everyone 
involved. Others see privatization as the only remedy to the intricate problem that is 
plaguing the City of Atlanta. This chapter also addresses the short-term impacts that 
privatization has had on the city’s water workers. 
Union’s Perspective 
The AFL-CIO has become one of the major advisories of the system of 
privatization. Lew Peeples, the International Union Area Director for AFSMCE, says we 
should take special precautions before implementing any system of privatization. He 
believes that in special situations, such as the one in Atlanta, privatization would be 
beneficial to the workers as well as the city. 
Supporters of privatization promise that private sector competition will improve 
quality of service and lower costs. Competition is minimal or avoided altogether through 
sole source contracts. In California, 64 percent of the private consulting contracts occur 
without any competitive bidding. The privatization process works to the advantage of 
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large firms that want to minimize competition to help maximize profits and market 
share. Big firms often have the resources to “low-ball” bids. They offer services at a 
relatively low price with the ultimate goal of raising prices later when competition has 
dwindled. All too often private firms and government officials have used illegal and 
unethical practices to award contracts and maintain them. Through the low-ball 
programs, it has been suggested that employees falsify documents to inflate job 
placement success rates so the agency could maintain its contract. States are responsible 
for monitoring the performance and billings of contractors, but the allotted resources for 
monitoring are usually inadequate. Contracts are not managed well, and audits and 
investigations cannot occur for lack of funds. 
City’s Perspective 
Private companies with government contracts often pay their workers low wages 
and provide few, if any, benefits. This hurts the local economy, and increases the 
likelihood that these low-income employees will need public services.1 The California 
State Employees Association sponsored SB 648 (Burton), which would strengthen 
protection against contracting out. The bill 
failed in committee, but not before winning wide support—including an endorsement 
from the California Taxpayers Association. 
An excerpt from the bill non-outsource requirement section includes: 
• No undercutting of wages or benefits. 
• No displacement or layoffs because of contracting out. 
• Rights for the union to bid on any contract. 
• The right to organize without interference from any contractor doing 
publicly contracted or privatized work within the union’s jurisdiction. 
1 California Labor Federation AFL-CIO, “Privatization=PrivateGreed” available from 
www.ealaborfed.org/calaborfed/privatization-html. April 1999. 
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• No contracting without open bidding, public oversight, a guarantee of 
real cost savings to the public, and demand that there be no automatic 
contract renewal or amendment without new bidding.2 
Peeples was not thoroughly prepared for the challenge that was proposed by the city. 
According to him, the city first asked about solving the sewer problem by working on the 
sewer system only. He was not warned or asked to give his advice on whether or not the 
water system should be privatized. According to Peeples, “The mayor just told us that 
Atlanta would benefit from the privatization.” Peeples was one of the opponents of 
privatization. “The only reason the Mayor wanted to privatize water is because it’s one 
of the only departments that the city mns in the black.” According to Tony Kirven, a 15- 
year employee of the City of Atlanta Water Department, “The union laid down and 
played dead during this whole privatization process.” They did not pay for the lawsuit 
that the water workers brought against the city, nor did they do a good job of keeping the 
employees informed about the status of negotiations between, the city and United Water.3 
The city employees were denied proper union representation that they were paying dues 
for. The advantages of working for a private company, for those employees who want to 
improve their skills and move up the ladder, are numerous. They will have the 
opportunity to participate in job training and skills-enhancement programs at no cost. 
They will have more choices about the kind of work they might want to pursue. They 
will even have the chance to change jobs if they desire. 
In Indianapolis, where United Water Services took over wastewater services a few 
years ago, city employees initially protested. The former employees are now grateful. 
2 California Labor Federation 1999, 2. 
3 Kirven Tony, Water worker interviewed by the author, 27 August 1999. 
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Many have moved up to better-paying jobs, and, according to the Indianapolis mayor’s 
office, the employee union joined with a private management company to submit the low 
bid for a large city maintenance contract. The City of Atlanta also chose United Water 
because of their successful transfer of city employees in Indianapolis and Milwaukee 
from public payrolls onto private payrolls. This was a major concern for city officials 
who vowed to protect water department employees’ best interest.4 
Impact of Privatization in Atlanta 
Early-Out Program 
The city also implemented an early out program. This was another method used 
to remove some employees off the payroll. The ordinance read as follows: 
Any office or employee whose age and creditable service before credit for 
accrued unused sick leave equals at least 73 years as of March 31, 1998, shall be 
entitled to a monthly pension benefit upon retirement without any reduction for 
any age or vesting penalties as would otherwise be applicable. 
All officers and employees eligible to retire pursuant to this section must make 
written application to the Pension Office between February 13, 1998 and March 
31, 1998.5 
Through this ordinance the city removed 84 employees from the payroll in the 
water department and never replaced them. According to the Atlanta Payroll Office, the 
water department went from 550 employees to 410. There were 140 people removed 
from the payroll, and they could only account for 87 of them. 
4 Carlos Campos and Julie B. Hairston, 
Constitution, Local News, 28 August 1998, 06D 
‘United Water's a safe selection” Atlanta Journal 
Michelle Brown, City of Atlanta Payroll Department, interviewed by the author, 4 September 
1999. 
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This begets the question, what happened to the other 53? Michelle Ware, of the 
United Water Human Resource Department said, “The employees were removed for a 
number of reasons, some quit, some were fired.”6 In the end, they were never replaced. 
Thomas Tourand will lose $1,154.10 per month from his monthly pension if he is 
forced to retire with a loss of $13,849.20 per year for the remainder of his life. The city 
has a policy that if an employee is to leave city employment on his own recognizance, 
that person will lose half of his pension (the portion the city contributed). All of the 
city’s water workers lost half of their pensions when United Water started their 
operations. This displaced a lot of workers because they did not leave city employment 
on their own. They were removed from the payroll due to privatization. A lot of the 
employees are fighting to get the remainder of their pensions, while others are 
reorganizing their retirement plans. 
United Water has taken over the maintenance of the city’s water system and there 
is an immediate impact on the people who decided to transfer to the private company. 
The workload has increased as a result of United Water’s permanent lay-offs. Every 
since January 1999, the water department has had a high turnover rate. Meter readers, 
who were full-time employees of the city, are now temporary employees. Eight out of 
twenty-one meter readers are now temporary employees. This caused water inspectors to 
work twice as hard to maintain the same quality of service they are used to providing. 
Inspectors who currently work for the water system feel overworked. They had between 
14 and 18 orders a day, now they can expect no less than 30. This is a drastic increase in 
volume. They are forced to do more work with less people. There have been no major 
6 Michelle Ware, United Water Human Resource worker, interviewed by author, 3 August 1999. 
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changes in the technology being used, but because of the growth in the Atlanta area, the 
work is steadily increasing. If the work situation does not change, the quality of service 
that the water department offers will be substandard.7 
7 Kirven, 1999 
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This paper has examined the effect that resolution 98-1710 had on the water 
workers of the City of Atlanta. The study sought to interview at least 50 workers. 
Contacting the 50 former workers who were cooperative proved very difficult. All other 
research tools mentioned in the methodology were used in order to conduct this project. 
Resolution 98-1710 allowed the City of Atlanta to implement a system that 
privatized its public water system. The privatization process began with the intention of 
addressing a long-time problem of the City of Atlanta, but in the long run, the process 
began to take on another form. The political power struggle, disguised as a bidding 
process, changed the whole focus of privatization. The dishonesty of the mayor and the 
misjudgment of the administration’s decision require one to question their motive from 
the beginning. The movement towards privatization brought out political opponents to 
compete for this contract, the largest of its kind in the United States. This paper outlined 
the background information that led to the privatization decision. The mayor addressed 
the need to correct a sewer problem that plagued the city for a number of years. Even 
groups like the Metro Group and the Georgia Black Chamber of Commerce, made their 
positions known in the matter. In the end, United Water won the contract for 20 years. 
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The paper also attempted to predict the future. Under current conditions, the black- 
middle class will have to look to another sector to give them employment and stability. 
Why a 20-year commitment? Although this is also the longest water contract in 
the history of the United States, the mayor’s office was convinced that it would be 
beneficial to the city if the contract would be 20 years instead of 10 years. 
The city workers of the Atlanta water system opposed the movement to privatize 
the water system. They opposed the system due to the possibility that they would lose 
the entire pension money accrued during their employment with the city and their jobs. 
They unsuccessfully filed a lawsuit trying to stop the privatization process from 
happening. 
The former city workers have taken dramatic changes in their workload, pension 
payments, and work security. They still have a case pending in court trying to get a 
larger portion of their invested pension. They went from stable city worker, to unstable 
private worker or unemployed in a matter of months. 
This paper set out to answer a lot of questions regarding the relationship between 
privatization and black water employees, but because the process is only in the beginning 
stages, it was difficult to give a comprehensive answer. One question that this paper did 
answer is whether or not the system of privatization is ominous to black middle-class 
municipal employees. According to the research, there is already a pattern of removing 
employees off the payroll by forcing some of the more experienced workers into 
retirement. This was the case in Atlanta with the implementation of an Early-Out 
Program. The Tourand case also showed the detrimental impact that removing the 
workers off the payroll would have on their future benefits and pensions. This is a 
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travesty for someone who worked for an extended amount of time with the city. The 
water employees were not happy with the move to privatization, and the mayor left them 
out of the whole process. 
They were not informed about the progress of the plan and were lied to in order to 
prevent them from participating in the Request for Proposal process. This was unjust and 
uncivilized. The employees’ distress was evident by the number of people who sued the 
city in a class-action suit. Although the city workers lost, they compiled over 200 
employees to file suit in court. There were roughly 500 employees in the entire 
department. The administration saw the potential monetary personal gains that this 
private contract would bring them and unfairly implemented the Request for Proposal 
process. 
The next question this paper addressed was how privatization would affect future 
employment. The work reduction that occurred in the water department raises concern 
about similar situations happening in other departments. The displaced water workers 
were not guaranteed a job with the city, they only had access to apply for another position 
if it was available. The city has plans to privatize other departments. Under the current 
contract, the United Water Company has to keep the same benefit package as the city for 
3 to 5 years. After that term is up, United Water Company is still required to work with 
the union. This is no guarantee that they will get a better deal. We have already seen the 
union disregard the needs and concerns of the workers. 
The union’s lack of protection for its members some of whom rendered their 
services for more than twenty years was another troubling fact. After conducting 
interviews with representatives, employees and former employees it is painfully obvious 
79 
that the union did nothing to ensure fair treatment of water system employees. Their 
lack of support and instruction leads us to believe that the union was not working in the 
interest of the employees. The question one must still be concerned with is for whom 
were they working? If not their long-term employees, then who? 
When talking about employment in municipal government in the city of Atlanta, 
one is talking about a strong portion of the black middle-class in the area. Any process 
that serves to remove people from the payroll should be examined and reexamined 
thoroughly. 
This system was implemented with money in mind. The intention of privatization 
may have been good, however, it is not unreasonable to conclude that privatization of the 
water system in Atlanta may do more harm to black middle-class employees than good. 
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